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This article proposes to analyze the relative deficit in Chilean criminal legal 
doctrine and practice to justly address determined manifestations of conflict and/or 
violence perpetrated by individuals and groups belonging to the Mapuche indigenous 
people.  
 That deficit is especially apparent in the framework of the progressive 
development of principles and norms of international human rights law applicable to 
indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. Those principles and norms have special 
binding force since Chile ratified Convention 169 of the ILO, which impelled a revision 
of the various branches of our judicial system, as well as criminal law, to examine their 
consistency with the standards. The deficit of our criminal norms and practices became 
apparent when compared with these principles and norms, along with significant 
perspectives for overcoming this situation. 
 This version forms part of a larger work that is in development. In this paper I 
review (in a more abbreviated form than in the original1) the form in which Chilean 
criminal law has addressed two forms of criminal behavior perpetrated by individuals 
and groups belonging to the Mapuche tribe, and that may be conflicting from an inter-
ethnic point of view (I); and I identify certain basic definitions, forming part of the 
ideological substratum of our criminal norms and practices, and that explain in good 
measure the limits of our criminal law to address those conflicts justly (II). A third part, 
                                                 
1 And dispensing with the greater part of the footnotes, for reasons of space and to simplify the translation 
to English.  
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not included in this version, will examine the perspectives for overcoming these limits 
offered by liberal multiculturalism. 
 
I. Two types of cases addressed by the Chilean courts  
 
Criminal treatment of the violence in the vindication/recuperation of lands: context of 
Mapuche as aggressor (terrorism) 
“On December 19, 2001, a group composed by approximately 50 people from the 
Mapuche communities of Tricauco, San Ramón and Chequenco entered the building 
known as Poluco Pidenco, property of the company Forestal Mininco S.A, located in 
the commune of Ercilla, proceeding to light more than 80 fires in two sectors of the 
interior of the estate. As a product of this action two large fires were formed inside the 
indicated building 
… 
In this context, personnel from the forest brigade that fought the fire were attacked on 
the morning of December 19, 2001 by a number close to 40 people, who seized two 
chainsaws and two portable radios. Chilean police officers that attended to the estate 
were also assaulted in the interior of the property, by means of rocks and other blunt 
objects” 2 
 
In one of the criminal proceedings against the Mapuche community members 
that had allegedly perpetrated these incidents of violence, in August 2004, the Criminal 
Trial Court of Angol3 condemned JHM, PTR, JML, FMS and JMS to ten years and one 
day of imprisonment for the crime of terrorist fire against the Polunco Pidenco site, 
property of Forestal Mininco S.A. 
This decision supposes identifying in these acts not only the characteristics that 
make any intentional fire a relatively serious attempt against the security of the people, 
or, if you wish, in a crime of concrete danger against (the life and health of) the people, 
but also a special gravity, that of a terrorist attempt. Beyond its danger to persons whose 
life or health were in concrete danger, a crime of terrorism would or could produce 
                                                 
2 Synthesis of the acts by Soto, Nicolás, ... 
3 Ruling of the Criminal Trial Court of Angol … 
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“indiscriminate damage,”4 affecting “the “public tranquility” (for purposes of causing 
fear)” and “[…]“the inner security of the State” (extracting decisions or imposing 
demands).”5 
In effect, as the Court argues in the ruling: 
“[…] the fire that affected the Poluco Pidenco estate on December 19, 2001, is precisely 
a terrorist act, given that the actions deployed on that occasion demonstrate that the 
form, methods and strategies employed had a painful purpose of causing a state of 
generalized fear in the area, situation that is public and notorious and that these judges 
cannot ignore; it deals with a grave conflict between part of the Mapuche ethnic group 
and the rest of the population, fact that was not discussed or unknown to those involved. 
 “In effect, the illicit […] is inserted in a process of recuperation of the lands of 
the Mapuche people, which has been carried out by means of action, without respect for 
institutionality and legality in effect, resorting to actions of force that were pre-
meditated, concerted and prepared by radicalized groups that seek to create a climate of 
insecurity, instability and fear […] These actions can be synthesized in the formulation 
of excessive demands, made under pressure by groups that were violent to the owners 
and proprietors, whom they threatened and pressured to yield to the requirements that 
they established…” 
 
In this decision it is apparent that the context in which the violent actions were 
produced, the “grave conflict between the Mapuche ethnic group and the rest of the 
population,” originating in turn from the historical demand –and the current objective– 
of the Mapuche people for the recuperation of ancestral lands which they consider to 
have been unjustly seized, played just such a determining role in the decision to treat 
such deeds as terrorist acts, as that context and this objective serve as a basis for the 
configuration of the (typical) legal existence of the singular crime being tried. The 
isolated fire of the Poluco Pidenco building appears to be a simple means for a purpose 
of greater magnitude, that of creating fear (terror) in part of the population, fear of being 
a victim of new crimes. The historical political context of the grave ethnic conflict in 
which the crime was produced, then, far from exonerating or attenuating criminal 
responsibility (as the principles and norms of applicable international human rights law 
                                                 
4 … 
5 Villegas, Myrna, “El Derecho penal del enemigo y la criminalización del pueblo mapuche”, … 
[“Criminal Law of the Enemy and the Criminalization of the Mapuche people”] 
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might imply), aggravates it. Likewise there was a special pronouncement issued by the 
parliamentary commission at the time of the actions.6 It was thus understood by the 
governments of the center-left Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia that dozens 
of convictions and complaints for infractions of the Law of State Security had been 
filed, and there were additional implications for the Antiterrorist Law.7 
The implications for the criminal valuation and treatment of these actions as 
“terrorist” extend beyond that of the toughening of applicable penalties, also reaching 
an important reduction in procedural guarantees. As this generally occurs in the legal-
criminal regimes, it has come to be known as the “criminal law of the enemy.”8  
The Mapuche perspective on the historical context. First approximation 
This manner of assessing the context that consists of defining the violent actions 
undertaken for the occupation of individual buildings as “terrorism” certainly contrasts 
with the vision that Mapuche leaders and community members have about the meaning 
provided by the context of these deeds. Although this claim is of course not argued in 
criminal proceedings –where the defense usually argues that there is no evidence of the 
participation of the accused in the deeds9– the leaders and community members 
involved in such proceedings understand that the historical-political context justifies the 
actions, at least for the following reasons:10 
i) The Chilean State violently and unjustly displaced the Mapuche people from their 
ancestral lands, by means of military actions that touched on genocide, to later plant the 
ancient communities on a very reduced fraction of their land: 
“…the so-called “Pacification of la Araucanía” […] was for the Mapuche a true war of 
extermination that culminated with the complete occupation of its lands, when it loses 
                                                 
6 “Report of the Commission on the Constitution, Legislation, Justice and Regulation…” 
7 “Report of the Commission…”, cit. note n. *, p. 154. 
8 … 
9 Thus, for example, in the cause …* 
10 * references 
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the war for independence in the year 1881. This period of war and violence is succeeded 
by the period of reduction [in numbers of Mapuche]”11 
“The historical roots of the conflict are primarily based in “the dispute around 
ownership of the land,” originating from the first inter-ethnic contact between Mapuche 
Nation and its conquerors […]. It is through the passing of the so-called Títulos de 
Merced and the transfer to private landowners of nearly the entire ancient Mapuche 
territory in la Araucanía at the end of the last century, that the ancient communities are 
cornered in a tiny part of their lands” 12 
 
ii) The policy of restitution initiated in recent decades is clearly insufficient, and has not 
succeeded in reversing the grave situation of poverty and marginalization in which the 
Mapuche people are found, nor in impeding the rapid process of cultural disintegration 
and the deterioration of the land: 
“Historically the communities have complained about the loss of their territory, 
however, the attempts to obtain a satisfactory answer to their territorial demands have 
been fruitless, generating in addition to the loss of their territory the economic 
impoverishment and degradation of the natural resources within the territory still in 
their hands. […] under Pinochet’s dictatorship, the institution in Chile of a state policy 
of developing forests, that has permitted the institution and growth of this kind of 
business in the Mapuche territory, to the detriment of the original inhabitants based 
there, has come to sharpen the conflict. The communities look to both the Chilean 
justice system (the courts) as well as other administrative authorities such as CONADI13 
in order to find an answer to their demands for the usurped lands, and try to negotiate 
with the logging companies and with the businessmen adjacent with their lands. 
Nevertheless, the Courts habitually rule against them, the negotiations with CONADI 
are trapped in long administrative procedures, do not give answers to their 
requirements, and the companies refuse to talk to them.”14 
 
iii) To reverse this situation of poverty and cultural disintegration it is urgent and 
critical to reform the ancestral lands in an extension and at a speed that the Chilean 
State does not demonstrate willingness to assume. The occupation and exercise of 
effective acts of possession, including those that formally violate Chilean law, are ideal 
and necessary measures for the recuperation of land, that may possibly and 
subsequently serve as a basis for a policy of “deeds accomplished,” so that Chilean 
institutionality is forced to recognize this possession and to regulate it. These measures 
                                                 
11 Final Report of the Commission of the Autonomous Mapuche Project… 
12 Case study “Logko Pichun and Norin Case” prepared by María del Rosario Salamanca 
13 Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (The National Corporation for Indigenous 
Development), public entity charged with coordinating policies on the subject.  
14 Case study “Logko Pichun and Norin Case”…  
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do not constitute unjust coercion because they are only performed on lands that are 
historically Mapuche, and whose occupation by the Chilean State or by “huinca”15 
private owners was only made possible by an unjust and violent dispossession. 
“After trying various means to obtain an answer and following decades of failed 
attempts, the communities that consider lands occupied by the loggers as their ancestral 
lands have decided to occupy them physically. Although these occupations may be 
considered by certain Courts to be illegal, the FIDH16 considers that in many cases they 
correspond to legitimate occupations. The government should assume its responsibility 
with respect to this problem and seek a just and viable solution to the fundamental 
question of the Titles of the lands in dispute.”17 
 
This Mapuche vision of the terms of justice provided in this context is directly 
linked with a couple key aspects of their historical and cultural identity.  
First, the Mapuche people are born of, and as such the possibility of their 
subsistence depends on, their permanent relationship with the lands on which they were 
originally established. Indeed, for the Mapuche: 
“the che man is an inhabitant more than the wajontu mapu, he is an integral part of 
nature and of the newen spiritual forces that exist in the territory, this being understood 
in its multiple dimensions.”18 
 
Second, this relationship with the land cannot be reduced to the concept of 
property employed by Western law, and it cannot be legitimately affected or interfered 
with by acts of private parties, as it is a relationship of the people with the land, that 
admits various forms of use and exploitation, with collective and individual titles 
according to the type of use and exploitation in question. It thus follows that, not only 
was the violent occupation by the Chilean State at the end of the 21st century unjust, but 
                                                 
15 Denomination currently used by the Mapuche to refer to the Chileans, and that historically (from when 
it was used with the Spanish conquerors) emphasize their invasive and usurping character. 
16 Federación Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (International Federation for Human Rights). 
17 Case study “Logko Pichun and Norin Case… pp.12. 
18 Case study “Logko Pichun and Norin Case in the context of the application of Procedural Penal Reform 
in the Mapuche territory,” prepared by María del Rosario Salamanca, and in the Final Report of the 
Autonomous Mapuche Project, in the Report of the Commission on Historical Truth and New Treatment, 
III, tome III, chap. III, in: 
http://biblioteca.serindigena.org/libros_digitales/cvhynt/v_iii/t_ii/capitulo_III.pdf, visited November 30, 
2011, p. 1217. 
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the operations, more or less opportunistic, that the “huinca” private parties have 
performed since then –a relatively recent period in the history of the Mapuche people– 
are not ideal, from the view of Mapuche normativity, in their effect on the permanent 
and inalienable relationship between the Mapuche people and its lands and territory. 
Indeed, for the Mapuche: 
 “The wigka view or in this case the non-Mapuche view that the State and the logging 
companies share, that views man as the dominator of nature and considers land to be 
private property, does not contain a concept of territory and grants the owner the 
potential for arbitrarily disposing of the same.  
From the historical point of view the Mapuche inhabitants of the territory in conflict 
feel themselves to be the original inhabitants and therefore with ancestral rights over the 
same. For their part the logging companies feel themselves to be the legitimate owners 
as they hold the titles granted by the Chilean State over the land that they occupy."19 
 
Additionally, the Mapuche view begins in good measure to see itself confirmed 
and legitimated “from the outside” by the fact that, in relatively recent times, Chilean 
institutionality has tended to recognize its special relationship with its ancestral lands, at 
least on the level of principles, first with a law (the Indigenous Law, N° 19,253, of 
1993) that recognized the concept of “indigenous lands” and declared them not seizable 
or alienable, and that created a procedure and a fund for returning any part of what has 
been dispossessed; then, with the revision of the “official history” about the 
“pacification of la Araucanía” by the Chilean State itself, recognizing the historical 
injustice of the dispossession and the justice and urgency of the measures for territorial 
reformation (in the Report of the Commission on Historical Truth and New 
Treatment20); and finally, with the adhesion, on the part of the Chilean State, to the 
principles and norms of international law that recognize the right of indigenous peoples 
                                                 
19 Final Report of the Commission on the Autonomous Mapuche Project, in the Report of the Comission 
of Historical Truth and New Treatment, vol III, tome III, chap. III, in: 
http://biblioteca.serindigena.org/libros_digitales/cvhynt/v_iii/t_ii/capitulo_III.pdf, visited November 31, 
2011, p. 1296. 
20 * references 
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to subsist as peoples, in their original territories, with their own law and their own 
culture (as recognized in Convention n° 169 of the ILO, ratified by Chile in 2009).21 
All of this, from the Mapuche perspective, cannot help but grant a different 
meaning to the acts of violence destined to (re)occupy and exercise acts of possession 
over the ancestral lands, one that justifies such behavior, above all if we take into 
account its perspective of the urgency of these measures to “save” the culture, economy 
and way of life of the Mapuche people before it is too late. According to many Mapuche 
leaders, this task would not be possible in a context of stagnation or given the return of 
the territories “in dribs and drabs.”  
 
Criminal treatment of precocious sexuality and incest among the Mapuches: between 
the negation of cultural difference and the declaration of a deficiency of personality 
conditioned by the culture  
Case 1 
“[…] the deeds according to the accusation of the prosecutor occurred on November 13, 
2004, during the night, in circumstances that the minor with initials U.C.H.R was found 
in the home of the accused, who proceeded to maintain sexual relations with the 
referenced minor of thirteen years of age […]. 
[…] [An] anthropologist, who performed an expert appraisal with the objective of 
verifying the social isolation of the accused and his community, drew upon the findings 
of the Mapuche defense, attending to the community Bernardo Naneo. It is a 
community with Pehuenche cultural identity, some 100 families, cultural structure 
based in patriarchy, exogamy, they speak Mapudungun, there is a strong presence of the 
Pentecostal church […] They have two types of access to information: television (3 
channels) and radio (3 stations), which do not generally arrive daily.  
[…]He concluded that the aforementioned community maintains ancestral cultural 
patterns, descendence through the paternal line, the family resides in the husband’s 
place of residence, the arrival of menarche, first menstruation, makes the woman 
accessible to adult men of the community, Mapudungun is spoken. In the summer the 
family is transferred to the mountains in November and return between March and 
April; they remain isolated. From Lonquimay to Naranjo there are between 2 and 3 
kilometers. He finished by indicating that the Community was not aware that having 
relations with the minor had been prohibited and criminalized by Chilean law […]” 
 
                                                 
21 * references 
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During the trial the question was planted of whether, from the cultural point of 
view shared by the Pehuenche community in which the acts were committed, sexual 
relations with a minor, biologically already in puberty, are considered licit or not, as 
background to resolve whether the allegation of the defense, that the perpetrator had 
acted in error of prohibition, should be well-received. The description and analysis of 
the anthropological expert, that would give basis to this allegation, did not convince the 
court, which was convinced, on the contrary, by the testimony of the mother of the 
victim, and by the evidence that the community had access to means of socialization 
(church, radio) that would transmit the values of Chilean culture (church, radio). In light 
of the factual background provided in the proceeding, and rejecting the claim of the 
defense that the accused had acted in error of prohibition, the Criminal Trial Court of 
Temuco condemned the accused for the crime of  statutory rape.22 
During the trial, in any case, the potential existence of different cultural values 
(according to which those in puberty i.e., those of thirteen years of age, may consent), 
was not used to examine and decide the unlawfulness of behavior, question that was 
never considered, despite the fact that it had been debated only five years before in the 
Chilean National Congress, when it raised the age of sexual consent from 12 to 14 
years.23 This question was only considered as a basis to decide whether the allegation on 
the part of the accused that he acted in error of prohibition was sincere and credible. The 
lack of conclusive evidence –in the opinion of the court– that the conduct was taken as 
licit in the cultural values of the perpetrator’s community, then, served as a basis to 
reject the sincerity of such allegation by the accused.  
Case 2 
                                                 
22 Ruling by the First Chamber of the Criminal Trial Court of Temuco... 
23 Consideration that the same defense performed… 
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… In this case (concerning an accusation of incest committed by a Mapuche  
community member with his underage sister), unlike that outlined in “case 1,” the court 
accepts the allegation of the defense that the perpetrator acted in error of prohibition. 
Again the question of if the cultural convictions affect or influence the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of the behavior is not at play, but only if they may, even in part, explain 
an error on the part of the perpetrator, at the time of evaluating if what he had done was 
licit or not, which is completely independent of that which his culture or his people 
think in that respect.  
In any case, the decision to accept, now as sincere, the allegation of the accused 
that he did not know that what he was doing was prohibited, reveals (in a perhaps more 
extreme version than in the other cases) a manner of valuing the context formed by 
beliefs, practices, and “myths” supposedly present in an indigenous community (in this 
case, Mapuche), that links, in a surreptitious manner, belonging to that “minority” 
indigenous culture with a certain deficiency in the cognitive, social, and moral 
development of the perpetrator of a criminal injustice. This is understood and valued as 
a certain disability, something more than a mere (“culturally conditioned”) error of 
prohibition: in a certain sense, as a manifestation of the immunity of the accused from 
prosecution (as is suggested by the ruling in passing, equating this deficit, improperly, 
to an error of prohibition) or an inability of guilt. The “cultural sensitivity” on which the 
absolution is based, then, in these types of decisions, comes to recognizes not simply a 
cultural difference of normative convictions, but a deficit of personality and rationality, 
conditioned by the culture, which is understood in passing as a more primitive culture, 
feature from which the exonerating capacity is derived (or of a lessening of guilt, in this 
case) from belonging to the same. 
Mapuche perspective on improper incestuous sexual aggressions?  
11 
 
It is more difficult to approach the valuation that members of the Mapuche people can 
make of the context of the precious sexual relations with adolescent minors (or incest 
involving them) “from the outside” than to do so in the case of the acts of violent 
recuperation of lands on the part of the Mapuche community members. The first reason 
is rooted in that, in the latter case, there is an explicit public discourse directed at raising 
the acts as an understandable response, while not justified, to an injustice. In the former, 
in contrast, there is no public discourse, if there may well be indicators that, for 
example, sexual relations with adolescent minors, while not clearly condemned as 
something illicit (as in the expert anthropological evaluation provided in “case 1”) or 
improper, above all if it occurs as an incestuous relationship, it would be judged with 
less severity by the Mapuche (as seems to arise from the anthropological expert 
appraisal in “case 2”) than by the Chilean state law (the punishment for which is up to 
twenty years in prison and with no less than five years and one day in any case). These 
differences in valuation would certainly not be read by the Mapuche as a consequence 
of their (absolute or relative) incapacity to understand sexuality and its corresponding 
norms, but of the relatively different valuation of the extension of these norms and the 




II. German-inspired criminal legal doctrine and its resources for the problem of 
multiculturalism 
 
Legal monism and its expressions in criminal law  
“One State, one Nation, one Law” 
The claim that the Law is applied in all of the territory of the Republic without 
distinction, with the same rules for all inhabitants, is associated with the fundamental 
principles of the Chilean legal order, which have a clear expression in criminal law 
through the primacy, practically without refinements, of legislated state law. The 
criminal prohibitions of this law are formulated in an abstract and impersonal manner, 
such that they should apply to all individuals, without exceptions, not even those that 
could be based in ethnic origin. It is certain that on the subject of mitigating 
circumstances and even, hypothetically, on matters of exemptions of criminal 
responsibility, Chilean criminal law admits the possibility of making certain distinctions 
based on indigenous custom (as shall be seen), but the limited extension given to those 
special rules, and the suspicion that its single existence awakens in some, accounts for 
the importance assigned to the principle that the law is and should be one and the same 
for all.  
One of these principles, seen from the interests of the beneficiaries of the law, 
would be that of equality before the law. Nevertheless, it is clear that the internal logic 
of this principle is not opposed to but –on the contrary– promotes the unequal treatment 
of those who are materially in unequal situations, with the potential for recognizing the 
relevance of the cultural differences in the definition of the legal responsibilities that 
should serve as a basis for judging behavior.24 Therefore, it seems necessary, in order to 
                                                 
24 As Renteln has highlighted in examining the moral foundation of the consideration of cultural 
defenses: “The reason for admitting a cultural defense lies not so much in a desire to be culturally 
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understand the insistence with which the Nation-States defend a monist perspective (one 
law only, the same for all), to direct the gaze to other principles that protect the interest 
not of individuals but of the State itself: national unity, cultural homogeneity and 
territorial integrity. 
 Indeed, until very recently, the great majority of states –and such is clearly the 
case of Chile– aspired to be Nation-States, model in which “the State was implicitly 
(and sometimes explicitly) seen as the possession of a dominant national group that 
used the state to privilege its identity, language, history, culture, literature, myths, 
religion, etc., and that defined the state as an expression of its national being.” The 
dominant group was not necessarily the majority, but even “sometimes, a minority 
capable of establishing its domination –for example, the whites, in South Africa, or the 
creole élites in some countries of Latin America– […].”25 
A series of well-defined policies were at service of this project, among them, the 
adoption of an official language established by law; the construction of a national 
system of obligatory education, with a standardized curriculum focused on the teaching 
of the language/literature/history of the dominant group; the centralization of political 
power and the elimination of the pre-existing forms of local sovereignty or autonomy, 
as well as “the construction of a unified legal and judicial system, that functions in the 
language of the dominant group and uses its legal traditions; and the abolition of every 
pre-existing legal system used by the minority groups.”26 
Also at the service of this project, and to make these policies effective, the 
construction of nation-states often involves the occupation of the lands, forests, and 
                                                                                                                                               
sensitive, although that is surely a large part of it, but rather in a desire to ensure equal application of the 
law to all citizens”; Renteln, Alison Dundes, The Cultural Defense, Oxford University Press,Oxford-New 
York, 2004 [Kindle version], position 3338. On cultural defenses, see infra *. 
25 Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 61. 
26 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, pp.62-63. 
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spaces for fishing that used to belong to the minority groups and indigenous peoples, 
declaring them to be “national” resources, and when these policies are resisted, using 
“various forms of ‘demographic engineering’ (for example, pressure on the group 
members to disperse, and/or the promotion of settlements by the members of the 
dominant group in the territory of the indigenous and minority groups) […].”27 
In this framework, the existence and operation of Mapuche law prior to the 
formation of the Chilean Nation-state were as problematic for this project as the 
existence of Mapuche territories where the group would exercise jurisdiction with its 
own authorities, its economy and its customs. Therefore, in contrast with the attitude of 
the Spanish authorities that during the colony had tolerated the existence of a 
normativity and some indigenous authorities to administer justice in the causes between 
Indians when the penalty was not grave, thus recognizing a certain validity of the  
Mapuche law although it was nevertheless seen as a primitive expression that should 
remain under Spanish tutelage, the authorities of the budding Republic of Chile, after 
independence, pushed the “assimilationist” model of relations between the State and 
state law and the indigenous:28 
“The prevailing ideology of the period was that the indigenous should assimilate into 
the dominant creole or mixed world, and therefore, the triple identity State-Nation-Law 
was created during this period, imported from Europe with the ideas of the 
Englightenment. As a political configuration, the State corresponds with only one 
Nation, defined by one people, one culture, one language, one religion […] such that it 
is precisely this model that in the realm of law tries to erase all vestige of its own law 
and traditional authorities” 29 
 
 And while during the 20th century certain rights of the indigenous begin to gain 
recognition, along with their cultural specificity, expressed in their language, dress and 
their religion, under the condition that they be integrated into national development as 
                                                 
27 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, pp.63, 61. 
28 Final Report of the Commission on the Autonomous Mapuche Project, cit. note n. *, p. 1032. 
29 Yrigoyen, … 
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“ethnicities,” not as “peoples,” the “monist” definition of a single law remained 
unquestioned, corresponding to the idea of “one State, one Nation, one Law,” 
corresponding to that which 
“all other norm or form of law not produced by the State is seen as a mere custom, as an 
isolated practice that can sometimes be ‘mixed’ with moral and religious rules. The 
indigenous laws, not being formalized like those of the state, are seen as backward, 
retrograde, pre-modern systems that should be subjected to and integrated into the State 
and to national law, to enable the civilization of those peoples that are equally 
‘backward’ […]”.30 
 
Legal Monism in Criminal Law. 
 Criminal legal doctrine has indicated the danger that instituting “local criminal 
laws” inspired by cultural diversity would represent for the (preventive-general) 
reinforcement of criminal prohibitions of alleged universal validity. In the words of 
Carnevali, in one of the most documented reflections on the subject in Chilean criminal 
legal scholarship: 
"One of the biggest problems that may be presented with the institution of collective 
rights, for example, the establishment of legal systems serving the cultural group, is the 
risk of the generation of ghettos within a society, that may lead to social 
dismemberment. Precisely, from a general preventative perspective, criminal law may 
hardly be effective in a society in which diverse normative identities exist. This is to say 
that through the recognition of cultural diversity as a collective right and the disposition 
of the members of such groups a seek their own ways of solving conflicts— the 
fragmentation of criminal law by the presence of individual criminal laws—, would end 
by permitting certain behaviors that are intolerable for the rest of the social component. 
It is sufficient to think of the practices of family maltreatment or of sexual 
aggression.”31 
 
 It is certain that cases of children’s and women’s rights have greater appeal to 
universal values than others, due to the transversal danger in every society of 
maintaining situations of structural violence and oppression whose cultural hold is only 
the reflection of the unjust distribution of power to generate and maintain norms that 
                                                 
30 Final Report of the Commission on the Autonomous Mapuche Project, cit. note n. *, pp. 1033-1039. 
31 Carnevali, Raúl. “El multiculturalismo: un desafío para el Derecho penal moderno”. 
[“Multiculturalism: A Challenge for Modern Criminal Law.”] Polít. Crim. nº 3, 2007. A6, p. 1-
28. [http://www.politicacriminal.cl], pp. 22-23. 
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favor the interests of some to the detriment of others.32 But, first, by its “emancipating” 
internal logic, this appeal that seeks to “protect minorities within the minorities”33 
(rejecting situations of structural violence and oppression that, while having formal 
normative endorsement in the community, have only acquired validity in the framework 
of an unjust nomogenetic system) is only valid for a fraction of the prohibitions (i.e., for 
the prohibition of slavery, of sexual exploitation, of open coercion by means of violence 
or intimidation), and not for many others (the protection of the majority’s moral 
convictions; property –in the face of non-coercive impairments–; or, certain institutional 
conditions or state functions considered necessary or useful for exercising individual 
rights). Second, even concerning prohibitions that appeal to universalist values 
stemming from the “emancipating” logic, their alleged validity does not at all imply the 
universal validity of a determined form of protecting them –criminal reinforcement, for 
example– or a determined legislative response to the prudent question of the intensity of 
the sanction considered just and necessary for the various forms of infringing upon such 
prohibitions.34 In this case the only thing that is “universally valid” might be the duty of 
loyalty to the democratic procedure of questioning and the abolition of norms (the only 
thing that can be demanded of the citizen in secular law, or one that admits the relative 
value of its criminal prohibitions), procedure that may well (with that which as 
universal may be at play in the definition of criminal norms) recognize local venues for 
the establishment and abolition of local criminal norms, in the face of which all 
members of the community must act with loyalty. 
It therefore seems that the appeal to the universal value of certain legal interests 
does not exhaust the explanation of attachment to the “legal(-criminal) monism” 
                                                 
32 As Carnevali argues ... 
33 Renteln, The Cultural Defense, cit note n. *, postion 3338. 
34 With more details, Couso, Jaime, Fundamentos del Derecho penal de culpabilidad. … [Fundamentals 
of the Criminal Law of Guilt] 
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perceived in the criminal legal doctrine, as in the entire portion of state-legislated 
criminal law that is not traceable to the universalist argument of emancipation (the 
largest portion, as it seems). This adhesion to legal(-criminal) monism seems to make 
reference, as background, to the much more general allegation that “a State” must have 
“one (criminal) law,” that reflects the convictions of the majority (which is not the same 
as “universally valid”): 
“While the effort directed at recognizing cultural identity may seem reasonable, it 
seems, in contrast, questionable and even dangerous that the cultural recognition of the 
minority peoples permits the justification of acts interfering with legal interests that the 
majority society esteems valuable. That is to say, it is difficult for a society to admit that 
the practice of certain acts generates duties of tolerance and therefore considers them to 
be legitimate only because they are grounded in respect for the customs of certain 
cultures. It is sufficient to think of the conflicts that may be presented to justify acts of 
family maltreatment or of bodily harm. As was previously established, decisions of this 
nature ―of communitarian tradition― may give room to manifestations of 
counterproductive social instability, examined from a general preventative 
perspective.”35 
 
 Although the example of the acts of family maltreatment again appeal to 
universalist values (after this evocation the oppression of children and women is clearly 
assumed), the extension of the “genus” (“acts attending to goods that the majority 
society esteems to be valuable”36) from which this example is taken, as “a species,” and 
as the basis for worry (“counterproductive social instability, examined from general 
preventative perspective”), they seem to reveal that, really, what is dangerous is the 
existence of a plurality of normative systems within the territory of the National state. 
 
Criminal unlawfulness as an impassable limit to the understanding of indigenous 
criminal conflict. The case of the culturally conditioned error of prohibition and 
“acting in conscience.” 
                                                 
35 Carnevali, “El multiculturalismo…”, [Multiculturalism] cit. note n. *, pp. 22-23. 
36 This limitation in the tolerance of diverse cultural practices also appears in the approach of important 
philosophers of multiculturalism, like Bikhu Parekh (cited by Renteln, The Cultural Defense, cit. note n. 
*, position 234).  
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 It is certain that criminal legal doctrine, today more than ever, has become 
sensitive to cultural differences. Carnevali’s approach takes note of this when it 
advocates for giving space to the excusing criminal unlawful behaviors conditioned by 
the cultural guidelines and convictions of the perpetrator, not only when –which would 
be a very rare occurrence– these guidelines and beliefs determine an unfamiliarity with 
the norm, but even –which would be rather more frequent– when they determine that 
the perpetrator does not “understand” the meaning of this prohibition, or when: 
“the effort of internalizing the norm is seen as particularly difficult on account of his or 
her cultural conditioning and that permits affirming that it is not possible to reproach 
him or her for lack of understanding ―culturally conditioned error.”37 
 
Accommodating this defense in criminal law, Carnevali concludes, supposes 
that “the judge weighs the cultural conditionings” of the perpetrator. It is a demand of 
the “principle of equality before the law."38 
 Nonetheless, in this consideration of cultural difference a basic aspect emerges 
that seems common to all expressions of the “cultural sensitivity” of criminal legal 
doctrine, the recognition of an impassable border or barrier: the affirmation, in 
accordance with the monist-legal system of criminal norms, that a criminal unlawful act 
has been committed in any case. This would be an impregnable definition from a 
multicultural perspective, adopted precisely from state-legislated criminal law, not 
subject to relativizations from the “local” normativity of a determined community of 
indigenous people. 
Thus, for example, referring to the criminal treatment that should be given to the  
“deed performed for motives of conscience,” where those deeds conditioned by the 
normative beliefs and conditions of the minority culture or ethnicity to which the 
perpetrator belongs must be situated, the most celebrated exponent of German-inspired 
                                                 
37 Carnevali, “El multiculturalismo…”, cit. note n. *, p. 27. 
38 Carnevali, “El multiculturalismo…”, cit. note n. *, pp. 27-28. 
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criminal law, the writer of treatises Claus Roxin, admits that this deed may be “exempt 
from responsibility” (which, in terms of the dominant systematic in Chile, would be 
expressed as “exempt from culpability” or “excused”) due to a lack of preventative 
necessity of the punishment, to the degree that the perpetrator operates under “coercion 
of conscience” provoked by the criminal injunction (contrary to his or her convictions) 
that provokes “strong pressure on the motivation.”39 But it also expressly rejects that 
acting on motives of conscience is justified by the legitimate exercise of a right 
(precisely, the right to freedom of conscience), which would be irreconcilable with “the 
claim of the law to establish objective norms of general validity.”40 
In this manner, the right not to be forced to act against one’s own conscience 
constitutes 
“only a right to indulgence, not to the legalization of one’s own point of view.” 41 
  
The Anglo-American perspective on “cultural defenses” 
 Anglo-American law and case law have developed the so-called “cultural 
defenses” or allegations that demand that the court take into account the cultural 
background of the party accused of a crime –or of the interested party in a civil or 
constitutional litigation, etc.– to modulate the judicial decision in a manner consistent 
with this background –in a criminal case: exonerating the accused of criminal 
responsibility, or attenuating it.42 This development has gradually become a point of 
reference at the time of debating the question of how to consider, also in the criminal 
                                                 
39 Roxin, Claus, Derecho Penal. Parte General, Tomo I [Criminal Law, General Part, Volume I], § 22, 
nm 121-122.  
40 Roxin, Derecho penal, cit. note n. *, § 22 nm 121. 
41 Roxin, Derecho penal, cit. note n. *, § 22 nm 121. 
42 In detail, Renteln, The Cultural Defense, cit. note n. *, passim. 
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law of the continental European systems, cultural and ethnic diversity at the time of 
adjudicating criminal responsibility.43 
 Read from the perspective of the conceptual and ideological substratum of 
German-inspired criminal law, this development seems upon first reading to confirm the 
correction of its principal assumption on this matter: cultural difference attenuates or 
excuses, never justifies; and, even so, should attenuate or exonerate only in exceptional 
circumstance, so as not to endanger the general preventative effect of criminal norms 
and punishments.  
 Indeed, upon summarizing the reasons in favor of cultural defenses in criminal 
proceedings, Renteln makes references that seem to coincide with this rather limited 
approach: 
“The rationale behind such a claim is that an individual’s behavior is influenced to such 
a large extent by his culture that either (1) the individual simply did not believe that his 
actions contravene any laws, or (2) the individual felt compelled to act the way he did. 
In both cases the individual’s culpability is lessened” 
“The balance is best achieved by the establishment of a cultural defense as a partial 
excuse”44 
 
 Nevertheless, when Renteln addresses the problem from the perspective of the 
right to one’s own culture, the logic that underlies the consideration of cultural defenses 
is shown to have greater reach, fulfilling a function much closer to the affirmation of a 
right to behave in accordance with one’s own culture –a right which, if applicable, 
should be given preeminence–, than that of a behavior certainly improper but more or 
less excusable: 
“[M]y own view is that individuals should have the right to follow their cultural 
traditions without interference, unless the traditions pose some great risk to members of 
the ethnic group or to society at large. The risk must be extremely grave, so as to 
threaten irreparable physical harm.”45 
 
                                                 
43 Carnevali, “El multiculturalismo…”, cit. note n. *, pp. 16-17. 
44 Renteln, The Cultural Defense, cit. note n. *, position 2929, 2937. 
45 Renteln, The Cultural Defense, cit. note n. *, position 2911. 
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 Indeed, for the perpetrator, only in these extreme circumstances should the right 
to behave in accordance with one’s own culture be denied, as, in the end, the right to 
live in accordance with one’s own life plans, defined by one’s own culture, are a 
“fundamental human right,” such that it cannot simply be yielded in the face of the 
allegation that there is only one correct way of life, as much as it is validated by the 
convictions of the majority society: 
“Until the right to culture is understood to be a basic human right, individuals will 
continue to be told that they must become assimilated, that their background is 
“irrelevant”, and that there one correct way to behave. In a culturally diverse society, it 
is necessary that individuals be permitted to pursue their own life plans without 
interference from government” 46 
 
 Otherwise, in her retelling of the form in which the considerations of cultural 
background influence the treatment of criminal cases, Renteln accounts for the effects 
that may be interpreted as the affirmation of a justification of the behavior.47 
The same may be said of the effect of cultural defense in the treatment of the 
sacrificial use of peyote –cactus with psychoactive and hallucinogenic properties, 
considered a drug in North American legislation48– by North American indigenous 
peoples, when it has led to acquittals; for example, in the celebrated decision of the 
Supreme Court of California in 1964 (People v. Woody), which recognized the 
hallucinogenic properties of peyote and the state interest in its regulation but identified a 
                                                 
46 Renteln, The Cultural Defense, cit. note n. *, position 3470. 
47 This occurs, for example, when deciding to accept or reject the allegation that the perptrator committed 
the deed in “self-defense” (a justification, not a simple exoneration). The standard employed consists of 
whether, under the objective circumstances in which the perpetrator acted, it was “reasonable” to consider 
a defense of the magnitude he or she employed to be necessary, issue that should be decided, in any case, 
taking into account the factors, cultural included, that would reasonably lead the perpetrator to this 
conclusion, such as the repeated record of violence exercised by the police and the agents of the state 
(that at some point in history came to constitute genocide) against the minority ethnic community to 
which the perpetrator belongs and that, in just fashion, made it “reasonable” to judge, under the objetive 
circumstances in which he or she was being assaulted, that the violent defensive reaction undertaken by 
him or her resulting in the death of a police officer was necessary. Renteln, The Cultural Defense, cit. 
note n. *, position 497-506. 
48 Also by Art. 5 of the Chilean Regulation of the Law on Drugs, N° 20.000. 
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collision between the interest of the accused, the Navajo, in exercising their religion by 
means of the use of the drug, concluding that: 
“Since the use of peyote incorporates the essence of religious expression, the first 
weight is heavy […] The scale tips in favor of constitutional protection  […]” 
  
 to subsequently make a clear declaration in favor of pluralism, not only cultural, 
but, in this arena, legal: 
“The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national 
life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when 
we protect the right of the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in using 
peyote one night at a meeting[…]”49 
 
 It is clear, then, that this decision does not try to excuse or exonerate the 
indigenous people for their culturally-conditioned incapacity to understand the criminal 
prohibition of the trafficking and consumption of hallucinogenic drugs, but to recognize 
the lawfulness of their cultural values and their different religious practice.50 
Legal custom and legal(-criminal) monism 
 In a relatively recent period, Chilean law has approached the question of 
multiculturalism with respect to indigenous peoples by means of the recognition of a 
certain value of the indigenous custom, even in legal-criminal matters. While indirectly, 
this has occurred when the legislator has taken this into account to modulate criminal 
treatment of behavior of a determined indigenous people, partially adapting it to the 
                                                 
49 People v. Woody (1964), cit. by Renteln, The Cultural Defense, cit. note n. *, position 1213. 
50 In fact, as of that recognition in the case law, the sacramental use of peyote by North American 
indigenous members of the Native American Church (NAC) has been an object of state regulation, 
permitting even its use by members of the the army that belong to the church, with the restriction of  
interrupting its consumption 24 hours before returning to active service and not transporting it in military 
vehicles or bases. Nevertheless, clearly establishing that this does concern a general revision of the 
socially noxious character of the traffic and consumption of peyote, North American case law has rejected 
extending its justification to individuals that are not Native American, even those that belong to the NAC, 
for which the non-discrimination clause was considered an obstacle, as the distinction was not “racial” (as 
was alleged), but “political” (thus, en U.S. v. Warner (1984), while the treatment in Warner v. Graham 
(1988) was considered discriminatory. Both decisions are cited by Renteln, The Cultural Defense, cit. 
note n. *, position 4218), explaining that it does not deal with simply permitting the behavior in the 
exercise of religious freedom (no one may found a religion that adopts the consumption of drugs as a 
practice), but an act of cultural pluralism facing a diverse indigenous people and culture. 
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relatively different value that they would have within this community (as in the  case of 
the Rapa Nui people51), or directly, as in the case of Art. 54 of Law Nº 19.253 (the 
“Indigenous Law”), according to which: 
“The custom asserted in proceedings between the indigenous belonging to the same 
ethnicity, shall constitute law, provided it not be incompatible with the Political 
Constitution of the Republic. In the criminal realm it is considered when it may serve as 
background for the application of an exoneration or attenuation of responsibility. 
When the custom must be given credit in a trial it may be proven by all the means that 
the law makes available, and, especially, by an expert report the should vacate the 
Corporation52 at the request of the Court.” 
 
 Upon first glance at this one may observe another expression of legal monism. 
According to this perspective, this tendency would be inscribed in the framework of the 
so-called “integrationist model” of resolution of the relations between the State and 
state law on one hand, and the indigenous peoples on the other, that recognizes the 
relative value of the indigenous “cultural specificity.” This specificity is also expressed 
in certain normative values relatively different from those expressed in criminal law, but 
without questioning the universal value of the norms of state-legislated criminal law, 
only marginally modulating the application of the exonerations and, above all, of the 
mitigating circumstances to account for the conditionings and difficulties that certain 
individuals face at the time of acting in accordance with the demands of law, derived 
from belonging to a culture that has certain different uses and customs.   
Indeed, the recognition of a certain value in the indigenous custom, with these 
limited effects, supposes the complete abandonment of the definition of the scope of 
typical criminal injustice, or the licit and the illicit, in the hands of state-legislated 
criminal law for effects of punishment, permitting the indigenous normativity only to 
                                                 
51 Law Nº 16.441, of March 1, 1966, that creates the Department of Easter Island, gave a criminal 
treatment attenuating sexual crimes and crimes against property committed on Easter Island by its 
natives: “Article 13 In the crimes contemplated in Titles VII and IX of the Second Book of Criminal 
Code, committed by natives of the Island and in its territory, shall impose a lesser penalty of the 
minimum degree indicated by the law for the crime for which they are responsible.” 
52 Meaning the National Corporation for Indigenous Development. 
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influence in the decision of if the individual is, and to what degree, individually 
reproachable for his or her unlawful behavior, or if he or she should be exonerated, due 
to the incapacity (if applicable, conditioned by culture –deficient, from the point of view 
of the state definitions of injustice–) to act in another way (to act dutifully, as the 
individual without personal or cultural defects would act). On the other hand, on the 
symbolic plane, the definition of indigenous law as “custom” in a legal order, and in a 
branch of law, that assigns legislated law a clearly superior value, to the point of being 
the source par excellence, also supposes a devaluation of indigenous law as a more 
primitive, less detailed and less developed normative product.  
Indeed, seen from the Mapuche point of view, Mapuche law ends up relegated to 
the space of mere uses and customs, “like the spurious product of an inferior culture that 
dares to challenge the normative homogeneity achieved after decades of codification.”53 
 Therefore, in the Mapuche view, the qualification of Mapuche law as “legal 
custom” 
“[is] a manner of negating the existence of the indigenous authorities and jurisdiction 
[…]. its recognition is seen as an open challenge to the State and its claim to have 
exclusive jurisdiction, sustained by the ideology of universalism and equality before the 
law” 54 
 
Nevertheless, even when this perspective reflects in good measure the limited 
advances with which the legislative decision to consider custom in criminal law has 
been received, what is certain is that its possibilities for configuring the boundaries of 
what is forbidden and what is permitted under criminal law are greater than they appear. 
This is such, first, because the Chilean criminal legal order does not associate the 
exonerating circumstances (or “exemptions” of criminal responsibility, which are 
referred to expressly in Art. 54 of the Indigenous Law) with the “excuses” but, at least 
                                                 
53 Barrientos, cited by the Final Report of the Comission on the Autonomous Mapuche Project, cit. note 




conceptually, covers with this expression (presiding in Art. 10 of the Penal Code) not 
just the excuses but also the justifications, or those causes that, after weighing of the 
interests in conflict, permit the declaration that the prima facie criminal behavior was in 
the end appropriate and legally correct. Moreover, some of these exemptions (that, like 
all, should be applied to the indigenous in accordance with their custom) are formulated 
in such general terms (for example, operating in legitimate exercise of a right, or in the 
fulfillment of a duty) that they have even come to demonstrate the affirmation of a 
conformity to law in general terms, without attention to the existence of an exceptional 
situational context.  
 
